Introduction {#Sec1}
============

In standard quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols, the security proofs assume that the parties have access to the correct and exact specifications of the devices used therein. This assumption is rather problematic. First, the principle problem lies at the heart of quantum formalism. Generally, these devices are used for either state preparation or measurement. The quantum formalism provides mathematical abstractions for states and measurements but no direct way to infer about them individually. The only interface for any inference about the states and measurements is via the Born rule which combines states and measurements and yields the probability of outcomes, which is compared to experimental results. So a full characterization of the devices is sufficient to warrant security, but it requires that each device and its components are individually tested several times to gather enough statistics in order to warrant trust. This is an extremely tedious task, instead we end up trusting the manufacturer of the devices, which may be not the best idea. For instance, the supplier can install backdoors that enable him to compromise the security without being detected. Recently a lot of attention has been drawn to NSA which convinced RSA Security to set as a default in their products Dual_EC_DRBG pseudo-random number generator which is in turn known to have such a backdoor \[[@CR1]\]. Moreover, even if the manufacturer is honest, recent advances in *quantum hacking* \[[@CR2]--[@CR4]\] show that the adversary can remotely influence the behavior of the devices during the protocol, effectively changing their characteristics thereby hampering the security of the protocol. To cope with this issue, the device-independent (DI) approach has been introduced wherein the key idea is that if the parties violate a Bell (or some Bell-like) inequality then, regardless of how their devices managed to do this, they can establish secure communication. Although the term "DI" was first used in \[[@CR5]\], the idea can be tracked back all the way to the original Ekert's paper \[[@CR6]\]. Unfortunately, completely DI QKD is extremely arduous to realize in practice and so far no experimental group has been able to do this. The main reason for this is so-called detection efficiency loophole \[[@CR7]\], which states that if the probability of registering a particle by the detectors used in the experiment is below a certain (usually very high) critical value, then the results of the experiment are inconclusive, in other words: the possibility of a local-realistic description of its results cannot be ruled out. Ruling out the possibility of these descriptions is a necessary, although not always sufficient, condition for DI security.[1](#Fn1){ref-type="fn"} Another problem faced in this scenario is that it can be applied only to protocols based on entanglement which are much more complicated than their prepare-and-measure counterparts like the BB84 \[[@CR8]\].

These two issues are addressed in the semi-device-independent (SDI) approach \[[@CR9]\]. Here a prepare-and-measure scenario is considered and again no assumptions are made on the inner specifications and the working of the devices used. Prefix "semi" is warranted by the fact that an upper bound on the dimension of the communicated system is assumed. It was assumed this bound is well justified for both honest and dishonest manufacturer. In latter case, the parties can study the devices delivered and, while it is almost impossible to fully characterize them, it is much easier to establish the effective dimension of the Hilbert space in which the states are being prepared. When the supplier is honest but the protocol is subject to a quantum hacking attack, the limitations on the technology available to the eavesdropper make the task of increasing the channel capacity extremely difficult. In fact, to our knowledge, all the quantum hacking attacks published so far did not increase this capacity. Also, because only one side employs the detectors, the requirements on their efficiency are lower than in the DI case. Another relaxation of the DI paradigm is measurement-device-independent (MDI) scenario \[[@CR10]--[@CR12]\], wherein three devices are used: two communicating parties, with perfectly characterized hardware, are sending the particles to the third which makes the measurements. No assumptions are made on the characteristics of the third device. The difference between MDI and SDI scenarios is that the former one is more complicated (i.e., requires more devices and more sophisticated measurements) and does not allow for any changes in the preparation devices (which is a big disadvantage as even small changes can lead to the loss of security \[[@CR13]\]). On the other hand, it was shown \[[@CR10]\] that MDI scenario thwarts quantum hacking attacks for any efficiency of the detectors.

The aim of this paper is to establish the security condition in the SDI case, i.e., finding the critical values of the security parameters required in order to establish a secure key. In the case of Bell inequalities, given an observed value of detection efficiency (greater than the critical detection efficiency), if the parties witness a Bell violation above a certain threshold, they are sure that the system they share must be non-local (or entangled if quantum theory is assumed). Similarly, we find the threshold above which the SDIQKD protocol is secure based on the threshold value of some observed parameter (for a given certain value of observed detection efficiency). We start by defining the classes of attacks against which we want to be secure. We consider individual attacks in which eavesdropper may or may not have access to quantum memory. Then we take the most basic SDIQKD protocol based on $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$(2\rightarrow 1)$$\end{document}$ QRAC \[[@CR9]\] and find the security conditions required against such attacks. Next we propose a modification of this protocol (basing it on the $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$(3\rightarrow 1)$$\end{document}$ QRAC instead) which substantially reduces these security requirements. Furthermore, we suggest a minimal characterization of the preparation device that substantially lowers the requirements on the security parameters.

Device controlling attacks {#Sec2}
==========================

In \[[@CR2]--[@CR4], [@CR14]\], the authors gave a simple description of the device controlling attacks based on the detection efficiency loophole and experimentally demonstrated the same. Assuming that Eve has perfect detectors, while Bob's detectors have an average efficiency of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$50\%$$\end{document}$. Eve intercepts the signal sent from Alice to Bob as a part of the BB84 protocol and measures it. Following which Eve encodes her detection results into specially tailored bright pulse of light and resends it to Bob. Because of the physical properties of the signal and the physical implementation of Bob's detectors, Bob obtains an outcome only if he measures in the same basis as Eve. This implies that Bob's detectors work perfectly (with $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$100\%$$\end{document}$ efficiency) conditioned on the even that Eve's and Bob's settings are the same and not work at all otherwise. On an average Bob's detectors work with $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$50\%$$\end{document}$ efficiency which does not raise any suspicions. After the raw key exchange, Bob and Eve have identical bit values and basis choices which after sifting, error correction and privacy amplification made via classical communication allow Eve to get the identical final key as Alice and Bob. In this way Eve, by active control of Bob's detectors, can secretly learn the exchanged key. More about this type of control can be found in \[[@CR15]\].

In \[[@CR13]\] a different approach is presented. Here Eve apart from exploiting her possibility of interfering during the calibration of Alice's device introduces a slight modification in it.

These examples highlight the need for more general security conditions where Eve is assumed to be substantially powerful, i.e., she can not only design all the devices used in the protocol but can also actively control them. However, there are natural limits to what she can do. Her modifications must not be significant so as to avoid detection. Apart from this, we assume that Eve cannot make the preparation device use additional degree of freedom of the communicated system to encode more information. Hence, in the SDI scenario we assume that the eavesdropper can mold the characteristics of the devices used as well as actively control them during the protocol but cannot increase the dimension of the system sent by Alice.

SDIQKD protocol {#Sec3}
===============

The DIQKD protocol bases its security on violation of a Bell inequality \[[@CR16]\] associated with the scenario. The key rate, in this case, is maximized by reaching the quantum bound of this inequality. On the other hand, SDIQKD is a prepare-and-measure key distribution protocol wherein the dimension of the communicated system is upper bounded \[[@CR9]\]. Specifically, this limitation is only for the dimension of the signal emitted by Alice's device and doesn't hold for what Bob's device is receiving. This minimal restriction is tremendously advantageous for Eve, which in turn captures the fact that in device controlling attacks, the pulse sent by Eve to Bob's laboratory could carry substantially more information than just one bit. The SDIQKD scheme bases its security on beating the classical bound on the winning probability (efficiency) of a related communication complexity task. In \[[@CR9]\] the task used was a $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$(2\rightarrow 1)$$\end{document}$ quantum random access code (QRAC) \[[@CR17]\], a prepare-and-measure quantum implementation of a well-known cryptographic primitive, the random access code (RAC). In a $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$(2\rightarrow 1)$$\end{document}$ QRAC Alice encodes her two input bits $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$a_0,a_1\in \{0,1\}$$\end{document}$ into a qubit $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\rho _{a_0,a_1}$$\end{document}$. Bob gets an input bit $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$b\in \{0,1\}$$\end{document}$ and chooses his projective measurements $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$M_b^B$$\end{document}$ based on it, where $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$B\in \{0,1\}$$\end{document}$ is the outcome of his measurement. Bob's task is to return $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$B=a_b$$\end{document}$, i.e., guessing the *b*th bit of Alice. The measure of success in this task is the probability with which Bob is able to guess correctly; we denote it by $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$P_B$$\end{document}$.

The SDIQKD protocol introduced in \[[@CR9]\] comprises of many repetitions of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$(2\rightarrow 1)$$\end{document}$ QRAC. In each of them $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$a_0,a_1$$\end{document}$ and *b* were chosen randomly by Alice and Bob, respectively. After this Bob announces his choice of *b* for each round. The bit $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$a_b$$\end{document}$ forms the bit of key for that round. Alice knows it, since it is one of the bits she herself randomly generated. Bob has some information about $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$a_b$$\end{document}$. Probability for Bob to obtain (for fixed settings $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$a_0,a_1$$\end{document}$ and *b*) the result *i* is $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$P(B=i|a_0,a_1,b)=tr(M_{b}^{B=i}\rho _{a_0,a_1})$$\end{document}$. Here, $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$M_{b}^{B=i}$$\end{document}$ are projective operators such that $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\sum _{i\in \{0,1\}}{M_{b}^{B=i}}={\mathbb {I}}$$\end{document}$. The primary security parameter is the average success probability for $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\begin{aligned} P_B=\frac{1}{8}\sum _{a_0,a_1,b\in \{0,1\}}{P(B=a_b|a_0,a_1,b)}. \end{aligned}$$\end{document}$$Parties randomly choose some of the rounds and announce $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$a_0$$\end{document}$ and $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$a_1$$\end{document}$ for those rounds in order to estimate $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$P_B$$\end{document}$. Later the parties perform standard error correction and privacy amplification to obtain perfectly correlated, secure bit strings (see Fig. [1](#Fig1){ref-type="fig"}).Fig. 1A single round of the SDIQKD protocol based on $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$(2\rightarrow 1)$$\end{document}$ QRAC. Here the larger boxes represent Alice's and Bob's laboratories of which their preparation and measurement devices, respectively (represented by smaller boxes), are a part of. The thinner lines represent classical communication channels, and thick lines represent quantum communication channels which in this case has a bounded capacity. The SDIQKD protocol contains the $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$(2\rightarrow 1)$$\end{document}$ QRAC along with a classical communication channel carrying Bob's input *b* and the classical post-processing at Alice's end (represented by a small disk) required to output $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$a_0,a_1,b$$\end{document}$ as inputs
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                \begin{document}$$P_b$$\end{document}$ is the only security parameter if we consider the ideal case with perfect detectors, i.e., all systems leaving Alice's laboratory are detected at Bob's end. In the case with losses, the average detection efficiency ($\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\eta _\mathrm{avg}$$\end{document}$) of Bob's detectors forms the other security parameter. It is important to specify how the communicating parties deal with the rounds in which no particle is detected. Although there are other options, here we choose the simplest one: these rounds are discarded from the statistics. This choice enables the parties to have the estimated average success probability close to the optimal one ($\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$(2\rightarrow 1)$$\end{document}$ QRAC).

Assumptions and attacks {#Sec4}
=======================

We make the following assumptions:Eve cannot influence the dimension of the system leaving Alice's laboratory,Eve performs individual attacks,For each bit of the key, Eve's information about it is stored in a bit representing her best guess of this bit,Alice's and Bob's devices are controlled by Eve. She can make detectors work with 100% efficiency if she chooses to. She also can send information to them by hidden side channels. This implies that the states leaving Alice's laboratory can depend on Eve's choice of measurement, while the measurement basis of Bob's device can depend on both Eve's choice of measurement and her outcome,There is no information leakage from the devices. This implies that Eve cannot receive any useful information using hidden side channels.Bob's observed detection efficiency is the same for each of his measurements.In this part of the paper, we study the security of SDIQKD against two distinct classes of attacks,Intercept/resend (without quantum memory),Delayed measurement (with a qubit of quantum memory). Fig. 2A snapshot of a successful implementation of the intercept/resend (IR) attack on SDIQKD protocol. Here again the thin lines represent classical communication channels, while the thick lines represent the quantum communication channel. The dotted lines represent channel for Eve's active control of Alice's and Bob's devices or equivalently channel for distribution of shared randomness. Notice that only the quantum channel leaving Alice's laboratory has an upper bound on capacity. Finally, as Eve does not have access to quantum memory, she has to output her guess of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$a_b$$\end{document}$ as soon as she intercepts Alice's communicated state. Therefore, classical communication carrying Bob's input *b* is of no use to her except in classical post-processing

Intercept/Resend (IR) {#Sec5}
---------------------

Eve intercepts the signal transmitted from Alice to Bob and measures it in a bases chosen based on her input $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$e\in \{0,1\}$$\end{document}$ (see Fig. [2](#Fig2){ref-type="fig"}) \[[@CR18], [@CR19]\]. Eve's input *e* represents her guess of input of Bob's input *b* for that particular round. It is crucial for the security of the protocol that *e* and *b* are uncorrelated, in other words that there is no information leaking from Bob's laboratory. However, Eve being able to choose different detection probabilities for rounds when $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$e\ne b$$\end{document}$ artificially introduces correlations between *e* and *b* at the level of post-selected rounds of the experiment.
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                \begin{document}$$M_e^E$$\end{document}$ and obtains an output bit $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$E\in \{0,1\}$$\end{document}$. At this stage, we can write Eve's outcome probabilities as$$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} P(E=i|a_0,a_1,e,b)&=P(E=i|a_0,a_1,e)\\&=\hbox {Tr}(M_{e}^{E=i}\rho _{a_0,a_1,e}), \end{aligned} \end{aligned}$$\end{document}$$where the first equality is because of the fact that Eve gets her outcome *E* before Bob inputs *b*. Here, $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$M_{e}^{E=i}$$\end{document}$ are projection operators such that $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\sum _{i\in \{0,1\}}{M_{e}^{E=i}}={\mathbb {I}}$$\end{document}$. In turns out that it is optimal for Eve to send the state $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\rho _{a_0,a_1,e,E=i}=M_{e}^{E=i}$$\end{document}$ to Bob, with probability $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$P(E=i|a_0,a_1,e)$$\end{document}$ as it represents her best knowledge about Alice's input. In fact, it is the most general strategy. Since we assume that the eavesdropper has full control over Bob's measurements, any unitary transformation of the state can be replaced by a corresponding transformation of the measurement bases.

According to assumption 4 Eve, for an observed value of the average detection efficiency of Bob's detectors $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\eta _\mathrm{avg}$$\end{document}$ can design in advance all the states $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$a_2$$\end{document}$ and *b* having just *e* chosen by her.
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                \begin{document}$$M_{e,E,b}^{B=i}$$\end{document}$ are projective operators satisfying $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\sum _{i\in \{0,1\}}{M_{e,E,b}^{B=i}}={\mathbb {I}}$$\end{document}$. Bob's outcome probabilities are given by$$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Delayed measurement (DM) {#Sec6}
------------------------

Let us now consider a more general approach with a more powerful Eve who is equipped with a qubit of memory $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Modified SDI protocol {#Sec7}
=====================

Here we present SDI protocol based on $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Conclusions {#Sec8}
===========

In this paper, we analyzed individual *quantum hacking* attacks on SDIQKD protocols based on QRACs where eavesdropper can not only design but actively control all devices during the protocol. Looking at these types of attacks was motivated by their recent experimental realizations. We study security against two types of quantum eavesdroppers (with and without access to quantum memory) and for two distinct levels of characterizations of the devices (with and without a minimal characterization of the preparation device). We found that access to small quantum memory (a qubit) does not help the eavesdropper to attack the SDIQKD protocol and conjecture that the same holds for other protocols and unlimited memory. As QKD in general is gaining immense popularity \[[@CR25]--[@CR28]\] and entanglement-based QKD remains commercially nonviable, devices employing prepare-and-measure QKD schemes seem to be natural way forward. Our analysis, other than being robust, deals with worst case scenarios and provides for the everyday naive user a hassle-free way to infer about the security his devices offer. In particular, Figs. [4](#Fig4){ref-type="fig"} and [6](#Fig6){ref-type="fig"} provide a straightforward way to ensure security; namely a user can crosscheck the operational security parameters $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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We provide condition for establishing a secure key for SDIQKD based on $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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We would like to remark that the critical detection efficiency is the efficiency of the whole process taking into the account not only the losses in the device of the receiver but also in the transmission. Therefore, in practice, they will increase with the distance between the parties and the critical detection efficiency of a protocol puts a bound on how far apart the communicating parties can be. For the standard device-independent QKD, this distance is just a couple of kilometers \[[@CR29]\]. Using SDI protocols described here, it can be significantly extended. Our results suggest a connection between security and MUB-based encoding decoding schemes, which deserves further exploration. While this work studied security of SDIQKD protocols with constrained capacity (dimension) of the communication channel, security based on other SDI constraints has also shown potential, for instance the oblivious constraint as introduced in \[[@CR30]\].

Appendix {#Sec9}
========

(i) {#Sec10}
---
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(ii) {#Sec11}
----
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                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\alpha _\eta =\arctan \left( \frac{1-\eta }{1+\eta }\right) $$\end{document}$. Hence, we obtain the security condition ([14](#Equ14){ref-type=""}).

(iii) {#Sec12}
-----

Here the success probability for Eve is$$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} P_E^\mathrm{max}(\eta )&= \frac{1}{2} \max \left\{ \hbox {Tr}\left( {\tilde{\rho }}_{i,i,j} \frac{M_{i,i}^{E=j} \otimes {\mathbb {I}} + \eta M_{i,1-i}^{E=j} \otimes {\mathbb {I}} }{1 + \eta } \right. \right. \\&\quad \left. \left. +\, {\tilde{\rho }}_{i,1-i,j} \frac{M_{i,i}^{E=1-\delta _{i,j}} \otimes {\mathbb {I}} + \eta M_{i,1-i}^{E=\delta _{i,j}} \otimes {\mathbb {I}} }{1 + \eta } \right) \right\} . \end{aligned} \end{aligned}$$\end{document}$$This equation is maximized when $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$M_{i,i}^{E=1-\delta _{i,j}}=M_{i,1-i}^{E=\delta _{i,j}}$$\end{document}$ yielding the same security condition as ([13](#Equ13){ref-type=""}).

(iv) {#Sec13}
----

In the case when Eve does not have access to quantum memory (IR), we can rewrite ([19](#Equ19){ref-type=""}) in a convenient way as$$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\begin{aligned} P_E^\mathrm{max}(\eta )=\frac{1}{4}\max \bigg \{P_E^{a_0=a_1=a_2} + P_E^{\mathrm{NOT}\{a_0=a_1=a_2\}} \bigg \}, \end{aligned}$$\end{document}$$where $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
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                \begin{document}$$\begin{aligned} P_E^\mathrm{max}(\eta )=\frac{1}{4}\bigg ( 1 + \max \bigg \{P_E^{\mathrm{NOT}\{a_0=a_1=a_2\}} \bigg \} \bigg ). \end{aligned}$$\end{document}$$Following exactly the same steps as above, this yields the security condition ([20](#Equ20){ref-type=""}).

(v) {#Sec14}
---

We find that the optimal states are$$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\begin{aligned} |000\rangle= & {} |0\rangle ,\nonumber \\ |001\rangle= & {} \cos \frac{\alpha }{2}|0\rangle +\sin \frac{\alpha }{2}|1\rangle ,\nonumber \\ |010\rangle= & {} \cos \frac{\alpha }{2}|0\rangle +e^{i\beta }\sin \frac{\alpha }{2}|1\rangle ,\nonumber \\ |100\rangle= & {} \cos \frac{\alpha }{2}|0\rangle +e^{-i\beta }\sin \frac{\alpha }{2}|1\rangle ,\nonumber \\ |111\rangle= & {} |000\rangle ^\perp ,\nonumber \\ |110\rangle= & {} |001\rangle ^\perp ,\nonumber \\ |101\rangle= & {} |010\rangle ^\perp ,\nonumber \\ |011\rangle= & {} |100\rangle ^\perp , \end{aligned}$$\end{document}$$where $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\alpha $$\end{document}$ and $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
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                \begin{document}$$ M_e^{E=a_b}=|M_e^{E=a_b}\rangle \langle M_e^{E=a_b}|$$\end{document}$), we use the following parametrization$$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\begin{aligned} \left| M_e^{E=0}\right\rangle= & {} \cos \frac{\alpha _e}{2}|0\rangle +e^{i\beta _e}\sin \frac{\alpha _e}{2}|1\rangle \nonumber \\ \left| M_e^{E=1}\right\rangle= & {} \left| M_e^{E=0}\right\rangle ^\perp , \end{aligned}$$\end{document}$$A straightforward maximization yields the security condition ([21](#Equ21){ref-type=""}).

Necessity stems from the fact that if the experiment could be described by classical model, it must be insecure as classical key distribution is impossible without additional assumptions on computational power of the eavesdropper. Whether or not this condition is sufficient depends on the details of the protocol and the power given to the eavesdropper.
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